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Notes and Comments 
WAYNE K. TALLEY 
Financing Port Dredging Costs: Taxes 
versus User Fees 
Ships, particularly containerships, continue 
to grow in size. Containerships exceeding 
9,000 twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEUs) in 
size are now entering some trades, and contain-
erships up to 18,000 TEUs are in the planning 
stages. One consequence of larger container-
ships is the burden that they place on ports, 
e.g., port channels often have to be dredged 
deeper. How should port dredging be financed? 
Should a tax be used? If a user fee is used, 
should shipping lines whose ships use the chan-
nel pay this fee? Should the user fee be a 
national user fee (the same at all ports of a 
nation) or a port-specific user fee? How should 
the user fee be assessed, e.g., based upon ship 
size, type and amount of cargo loaded and 
unloaded while in port, or time in port per call? 
This article discusses tax and user fee pro-
grams for financing port dredging costs. By 
doing so, it provides background information 
for addressing the above questions. The next 
section discusses the U.S. tax and proposed 
Clinton Administration national user fee pro-
grams for financing port dredging costs. Then, 
a port-specific user dredging fee model is pre-
sented, followed by a discussion of implement-
ing port-specific user dredging fees. The next 
sections discuss external benefits and vessel 
cargo in financing port dredging costs. Finally, 
a summary of the discussion is presented. 
THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 
Prior to 1986 the costs of the U.S. govern-
ment's sponsored programs for the deepening 
and maintenance of port channels were fi-
nanced from the federal general tax fund in 
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the amount of 65 percent, with state or local 
governments being responsible for the re-
maining 35 percent. In 1986 the U.S. Congress 
passed the Water Resources Development Act, 
replacing the federal general tax fund with the 
Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) as 
the federal revenue source for financing chan-
nel deepening and maintenance costs. The rev-
enue source for the trust fund is the Harbor 
Maintenance Tax (HMT), an ad valorem tax 
placed on the value of exported, imported, and 
some domestic (coast and lake, but generally 
excluding inland waterway) cargo moving to 
and from U.S. ports. The tax rate was originally 
set at 0.04 percent of the value of the cargo. 
With the passage of the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1990, the rate was increased 
to 0.125 percent (effective January 1, 1991). 
In 1998 the U.S. Supreme Court declared 
the HMT to be in violation of the export clause 
of the U.S. Constitution that "No Tax or Duty 
shall be laid on Articles exported from any 
State" (Article 1, Section 9, Clause 5). As a 
result, the HMT collections from exporters 
were discontinued as of April 25, 1998-but 
remained on imports and certain domestic and 
foreign trade zone cargoes. However, in the 
same opinion, the Supreme Court also ruled 
that exporters are not exempt from user fees 
to defray dredging costs. The Court ruled that 
a user fee determined by ''the extent and man-
ner of port use depending on factors such as 
the size and tonnage of a vessel, the length 
of time it spends in port and the services it 
requires-for instance, harbor dredging'' 
would meet the constitutionality test (U. S. 
Army Corps of Engineers 2001, 9). The Euro-
pean Union has also been critical of the HMT, 
equating the tax to an illegal barrier to their 
exports by being in violation of several GA TT 
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(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) ar-
ticles. 
In I 999 the Clinton Administration proposed 
that the HMTF be replaced with the Harbor 
Services Fund (HSF) that would be financed 
from a national user fee (i.e., not port-specific) 
on commercial vessels. The fee would vary 
with vessel size, type, and typical number of 
port calls made by a vessel during each U.S. 
visit. Vessel type was classified with respect 
to general cargo (including container), tanker, 
bulk, and passenger vessels. Vessel size was 
to be based on the Vessel Capacity Units 
(VCUs) of each vessel-the net tonnage of the 
vessel adjusted for cargo and passenger spaces 
not included in the estimation of the vessel's 
net registered tonnage (Kumar 2002). The ra-
tionale for using vessel type is that different 
types of vessels require different levels of ser-
vice in port. Containerships, for example, have 
tight sailing schedules and thus wish to berth 
on arrival. Alternatively, tankers and bulk ves-
sels do not have tight sailing schedules and 
thus have greater flexibility in their berthing 
schedules. Also, containerships are likely to 
visit a number of ports on each U.S. voyage, 
unlike tankers and bulk vessels. 
Under the Clinton proposal, tankers and bulk 
vessels would be levied a user fee for each port 
call, whereas general cargo and cruise vessels 
would be levied a user fee only for the first 
and last ports of call for each U.S. voyage. The 
user fee would replace the HMT and the funds 
in the HMTF would be transferred to the HSF. 
The Clinton Administration argued that the 
user fee would meet the constitutionality test 
of the U.S. Supreme Court (by linking revenue 
collected to services provided in port) and be 
consistent with the WTO (World Trade Organi-
zation)/GA TT obligations toward trading part-
ners. However, facing opposition from such 
key port stakeholders as the American Associa-
tion of Port Authorities and U.S. and foreign 
shipping lines, the U.S. Congress did not act 
on the proposal. Those in opposition argued 
that the proposal would alter the competitive 
status quo among U.S. ports and divert cargo 
to Canadian and Mexican ports. However, the 
primary reason was likely the fact that user 
fees would be placed on vessels as opposed to 
cargo, as for the HMTF program. 
Both the HMTF and HSF programs are and 
would be expected to result in cross-subsidiza-
tion in financing the nation's port dredging 
costs, since the tax rate and user fees do not 
or would not vary across ports. The lower-
dredging-cost ports are likely cross-subsidizing 
or would cross-subsidize the higher-dredging-
cost ports-i.e., the surplus HMT revenue (the 
HMT revenue collected at a port that exceeds 
the government's dredging expenditure at the 
port) from a lower-dredging-cost port is used 
to cover the deficit HMT revenue (the HMT 
revenue collected at a port that is less than the 
government's dredging expenditure at the port) 
from a higher-dredging-cost port. A lower-
dredging-cost port may have a sandy bottom, 
whereas a higher-dredging-cost port may have 
a rocky bottom. Cross-subsidization among a 
nation's ports would also likely occur under 
the HSF program. 
Since the programs' tax rate and user fees 
are the same for all U.S. ports, they do not 
necessarily reflect the dredging costs of spe-
cific ports and thus would not be expected to 
result in a cost-efficient allocation of dredging 
resources among U.S. ports. Such a cost-effi-
cient allocation is one for which the deepest 
levels of dredged water depths for ports are 
obtained for a given national dredging cost 
expenditure. Alternatively, if the allocation is 
cost inefficient, greater cost will be incurred in 
obtaining these levels of dredged water depths. 
Consequently, the domestic retail prices for 
goods that move through U.S. ports will be 
higher than for a cost-efficient allocation, all 
else held constant. Furthermore, lower-dredg-
ing-cost ports are not being allowed to enjoy to 
the fullest extent their comparative advantage. 
A PORT-SPECIFIC USER DREDGING FEE 
MODEL 
Rather than having a national tax (e.g., the 
HMT) or national user dredging fees (e.g., the 
Clinton proposal) to finance port dredging 
costs, suppose each port is to establish its own 
user fees for financing its dredging costs. The 
result might be that higher-dredging-cost ports 
charge higher dredging fees per vessel call than 
lower-dredging-cost ports, thus placing the for-
mer ports at a competitive disadvantage versus 
the latter ports. However, this outcome does 
not necessarily follow. Higher-dredging-cost 
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ports may have a sufficiently large number 
of vessel calls that share the dredging costs, 
thereby resulting in lower user dredging fees 
than at lower-dredging-cost ports that have a 
smaller number of vessel calls. 
What criteria might be used to establish port-
specific user dredging fees? Possible criteria 
include the following: ( 1) the revenue from the 
fees should cover the dredging cost-no more, 
no less, (2) all vessels of the same type and 
size that use the channel should pay the same 
fee, and (3) the fee for a given type and size 
of vessel should not exceed its standalone 
dredging cost (i.e., the dredging cost to be in-
curred when it is the only user of the channel). 
If the dredging fee for a given type and size 
vessel exceeds its standalone dredging cost, it 
follows that the dredged (shared) channel at 
the given depth is cost inefficient for this ves-
sel, i.e., this vessel can lower its allocated 
dredging cost by having the channel at a diffe~-
ent depth. This cost inefficiency can be investi-
gated by allocating dredging cost among ves-
sels (that utilize a given dredged channel at a 
given depth) based upon a formula or rule that 
uses standalone dredging costs, i.e., the rule 
can determine the allocated dredging cost for 
this channel for a given vessel, which then 
can be compared to the vessel's standalone 
dredging cost for this channel. 1 The pricing 
scheme of establishing prices for the users of 
a shared infrastructure or facility based upon 
a set of criteria for allocating the shared cost 
of the infrastructure or facility among its users 
has been referred to in the literature as cost 
axiomatic pricing (Talley 1994). 
Formulae for allocating shared costs that 
consider the standalone costs of the users have 
been referred to as alternative capacity rules 
(Talley 1988). One such formula is Moriarity's 
Rule. Suppose CK is the dredging cost at a 
port to be shared among K types and sizes of 
vessels. The fraction (fk) of this dredging cost 
to be allocated to the number (V k) of vessels 
of the kth type and size by Moriarity's Rule 
may be expressed as: 
fk = C(Vk)/IC(Vk) (1) 
where Ck=C(V k) is the standalone dredging 
cost to be incurred by the number (V k) of ves-
sels of the kth type and size that use the channel. 
The product fkCK is the allocated cost share of 
CK (or user fee) to be borne by Qk vessel~. If 
there are T vessels of the kth type and size, 
the tth individual vessel will be assigned a cost 
share or fee of fkCK/ I,Vkt· Moriarity's Rule 
satisfies the user fee criteria l and 2 above. It 
will also satisfy criterion 3 if fkCK ~ Ck. 
Another alternative capacity rule is the 
Shapley Value Ruie,2 i.e., 
fk1CK = fk - 1,tCk + [(Ck - ck-1)/ rvktl (2) 
where fkiCK is the cost share (in dollars) of CK 
dredging cost to be borne by the tth ~ndividu~l 
vessel (V kt) of the kth type and size; fkt 1s 
the cost share expressed as a fraction. As for 
Moriarity' s Rule , Ck is the standalone cost for 
the kth type of vessel and size. If the kth type 
of vessel and size is the largest among the K 
types and sizes, then Ck = CK. Further, the k-
l type and size vessel is smaller in size t~an 
the kth type and size; the k-2 type and size 
vessel is smaller in size than the k-1 type 
and size. 
By the Shapley Value Rule, the cost alloca-
tions (or user fees) of the dredging cost CK 
among the vessels that utilize the channel are 
determined as follows: For k=l (or the small-
est) vessel size, the cost C1 (or the standalone 
dredging cost for the smallest size vessel) is 
divided equally among all vessels that use the 
channel; the difference between the standalone 
costs for the smallest vessel size and the next 
largest vessel size (C2 - C1) is divided among 
all ships except the smallest size v~sse_l;. and 
so on until the last cost increment 1s d1v1ded 
only among the vessels of the largest size. ~he 
Shapley Value Rule satisfies the ~ser fe~ cr~te-
ria l and 2 above. It will also satisfy cntenon 
3 if fkCK ~ Ck. The Shapley Value Rule has 
been used in practice for determining aircraft 
landing fees at airports. 
IMPLEMENTING PORT-SPECIFIC USER 
DREDGING FEES 
There are two types of dredging costs: con-
struction and maintenance. Construction costs 
may be those incurred in the initial dredging 
of a waterway, e.g., when a waterway of natural 
depth of thirty feet is dredged to a depth of forty 
feet. Construction costs for this same waterway 
will be also incurred at a subsequent time pe-
riod if the waterway is dredged to a depth of 
forty-five feet. Maintenance dredging costs are 
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incurred when dredging is done to maintain 
the dredged waterway at a given depth, e.g., 
at forty-five feet. 
User fees can be used to allocate the con-
struction dredging costs of a waterway among 
the vessels that use the waterway. However, if 
alternative capacity rules are used to allocate 
these costs and thus determine the fees, only 
those vessels for which the dredging of the 
waterway is necessary (i.e., dredging deeper 
than the natural depth or dredging a dredged 
waterway at a deeper depth) would share in 
the construction dredging costs. For example, 
only those vessels that require that the water-
way be dredged from an initial natural depth of 
thirty to forty feet would share in the dredging 
construction cost. If larger vessels in the future 
wish to use the waterway but require a deeper 
waterway depth of forty-five feet, only these 
vessels would share in this construction cost. 
Alternatively, those vessels for which the natu-
ral depth of the waterway is sufficient would 
not be allocated a share of the dredging con-
struction costs. Note that these results differ 
for allocating runway construction costs among 
landing airplanes at an airport. Since there is 
no natural runway, assuming the runway has 
to be paved, all airplanes that utilize (land on 
and take off from) the runway would share in 
the construction costs of the runway. 
Assuming that without maintenance dredg-
ing the waterway would eventually return to 
its natural depth, all vessels that require water 
depths greater than the natural depth would be 
allocated maintenance dredging costs. If there 
is a steady-state dredged depth greater than the 
natural depth, i.e., a depth that remains without 
maintenance dredging, then only those ships 
that require a deeper depth would share in the 
maintenance dredging cost. 
Port-specific user dredging fees for a nation 
will allow lower-dredging-cost ports to take 
advantage of their comparative advantage in 
dredging. However, the port-specific user fees 
at some ports in a nation may be higher or 
lower than a national tax or national user fee 
program. Port-specific user dredging fees are 
expected to provide for a more cost-efficient 
allocation of resources for dredging a nation's 
ports as opposed to a national tax or national 
user fee program. Dredging resources at 
higher-dredging-cost ports may move to lower-
dredging-cost ports. The lowering of a nation's 
port dredging costs, in tum, may result in lower 
domestic retail prices for goods that move 
through its ports. 
PORT-SPECIFIC USER DREDGING FEES AND 
NON-USERS 
Heretofore, it has been implicitly assumed 
that the benefits of a dredged channel accrue 
only to the users (i.e., vessels) of the channel. 
However, non-users may also benefit from the 
dredged channel, i.e., external benefits or posi-
tive spillover effects exist. If so, the public 
finance literature suggests that these non-users 
should also share in the cost of dredging the 
channel. If non-user benefits accrue to the gen-
eral public, then government should subsidize 
the dredging costs (Rosen 1985). 
The total demand for a dredged port channel 
is the sum of the user and non-user demands. 
The share of dredging cost to be borne by 
non-users (or government) should reflect the 
proportion of non-user demand to total de-
mand. Alternatively, the share of the dredging 
cost to be borne by users (or vessels) should 
reflect the proportion of user demand to total 
demand. This cost share can then be allocated 
among individual users (or vessels) as de-
scribed above by port-specific user dredging 
fees. 
PORT-SPECIFIC USER DREDGING FEES AND 
VESSEL CARGO 
Heretofore, it has also been implicitly as-
sumed that the amount of cargo (or passengers) 
carried by a vessel has no effect on the amount 
of waterway water that the vessel draws. How-
ever, in reality, a vessel will draw more water 
and thus require a deeper channel as the amount 
of cargo transported increases. The amount of 
cargo transported by a vessel can be incorpo-
rated into our port-specific user dredging fee 
model above by replacing V ko the tth individual 
vessel of the kth type and size, with Vktr, the 
tth individual vessel of the kth type and size 
transporting ''r'' tonnage of cargo. If there are 
ranges of ''r'' that affect the amount of water 
that a vessel draws, constraints on ''r'' will 
have to be imposed. For example, there may 
be an initial range of cargo tonnage that does 
not affect the amount of water that a vessel 
draws. 
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It is interesting to note that with the inclusion 
of cargo in the above model, the user dredging 
fee model now becomes a user (or vessel) and 
cargo dredging fee model, assuming that cargo 
is allocated the cost of dredging attributable to 
the increase in water ( or dredged) depth re-
quired by a given vessel in transporting "r" 
tonnage of cargo. Note that the "r" cargo ton-
nage would include the weight of the wrapping 
or boxing of cargo, e.g., the weight of skids 
for breakbulk cargo or the weight of containers 
for containerized cargo. Further, the model pro-
vides theoretical support for allocating port 
dredging costs on vessels and cargo. 
SUMMARY 
In 1986 the U.S. Congress passed the Water 
Resources Development Act, replacing the fed-
eral general tax fund with the Harbor Mainte-
nance Trust Fund (HMTF) as the federal reve-
nue source for financing the construction and 
maintenance dredging costs of port channels. 
The revenue source for this trust fund is the 
Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT), an ad val-
orem tax placed on the value of cargo. How-
ever, in 1998 the U.S. Supreme Court declared 
the HMT to be in violation of the export clause 
of the Constitution. In 1999 the Clinton Admin-
istration proposed that the HMTF be replaced 
with the Harbor Services Fund (HSF) to be 
financed from a national port user fee placed 
on commercial vessels that call at U.S. ports. 
Facing opposition from key port stakeholders, 
the U.S. Congress did not act on this proposal. 
The stakeholders argued that the proposal 
would alter the competitive status quo among 
U.S. ports and divert cargo to Canadian and 
Mexican ports. Both the HMTF and HSF pro-
grams are and would be expected to result in 
the cross-subsidization in the finance of U.S. 
port dredging costs, since the tax rate and user 
fees do not or would not vary across ports. 
Port-specific user dredging fees will allow 
lower-cost-dredging ports to make the most 
of their comparative advantage, as opposed to 
national tax and user fee dredging programs. 
They would also provide for a more cost-effi-
cient allocation of the dredging resources 
among a nation's ports. The lowering of a na-
tion's port dredging costs, in tum, may result 
in lower domestic retail prices for goods that 
move through a nation's ports. However, these 
fees are likely to vary across the nation's ports. 
The port-specific user dredging fee model 
presented in this article has provided a theoreti-
cal framework for implementing port-specific 
user dredging fees that satisfy the criteria: (I) 
the revenue from the fees should cover the 
dredging costs-no more, no less, (2) all ves-
sels of the same type and size that use a given 
dredged waterway should pay the same fee, 
and (3) the fee for a given type and size of 
vessel should not exceed its standalone dredg-
ing cost, thereby promoting cost efficiency in 
dredging. Further, the model provides theoreti-
cal support for non-users who benefit from 
dredged waterways and vessel cargo to be in-
volved in the financing of port dredging costs. 
ENDNOTES 
1 If the cost allocations of a port's dredged 
channel (at a given depth) among vessels that 
utilize this channel are core allocations, then 
the channel will be the least costly dredged 
channel at the port to be shared by the vessels. 
Three conditions must be satisfied for the cost 
allocations to be core cost allocations. The 
Condition of Group Rationality states that the 
sum of the cost allocations must equal the 
dredging cost that is allocated. The Condition 
of Individual Rationality states that the dredg-
ing cost allocation assigned to a given vessel 
must be no greater than its corresponding (for 
the same channel) standalone dredging cost. 
The Condition of Coalition Rationality states 
that the sum of the cost allocations assigned 
to any sub-group of vessels that use the channel 
must be no greater than the cost to be incurred 
in providing an exclusive dredged channel (for 
the same channel) for this sub-group of vessels. 
If one or more of these conditions are not satis-
fied, then the dredged channel at the given 
depth is cost inefficient for at least one of the 
vessels, i.e., a vessel can lower its allocated 
dredging cost by having the channel at a differ-
ent depth. In our discussion, we have assumed 
that cost inefficiency arises when the Condition 
of Individual Rationality is not satisfied. How-
ever, it may also arise when the Condition of 
Coalition Rationality is not satisfied. 
2For further discussion of the Shapley Value 
Rule see Talley (1988). 
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